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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADvsru;it

Possts~ION-MISTAKE.-From

a decree quieting in plaintiff title

by adverse possession, defendants appealed, contending thal: plaintiff claimed

the land only under and by virtue of a will which in fact conferred no legal
title, and that such a claim was not adverse. Held, assuming that plaintiff
believed he was asserting legal rights only, and that his claim of title was
defective, his possession would nevertheless ripen into title by adverse possession. Erickson v. Crosby, (Neb. 1916) 16o N. W. 94Slightly different facts raised a somewhat similar question in another
jurisdiction. In a suit to quiet title, plaintiff sought to show that he and
his predecessor had held the land adversely for the statutory period. It appeared . that plaintiff's grantor had occupied the land in question under a
mistake as to his true boundary line. Held, obe who by mistake as to the true
line occupies beyond it, claiming a right only to the true line, does not occupy
adversely to the actual owner. Jahnke v. Seydel, (Ia. 1916) 159 N. W. g86.
The courts do not differ as to the elements necessary to rendar the claim
and possession of land adverse to the true owner. Theoretically the occupant must claim the land as his own ·in either jurisdiction. Where a mistake is shown, the question becomes a hypothetical one. Would the occu-.
pant have held the land as his own if he had known that his legal claim tO'
it was without foundation? The Nebraska court presumes the affirmative
of this proposition; the Iowa court, the negative. The particular presumption adopted, although rebuttable, invariably controls the decision. The great
weight of authority supports the rule applied in Nebraska. The recent case
of Janke v. McMahon, 21 Calif. App. 781,:.i33 Pac. 21, accords with the Iowa
case. For other cases, and an analysis of the question, see I I Mic:a:. L.
~. 57.
ANNUU.MltNT OF MARRIAGJ;-INR~NT POWERS OF EQUITY TO GRANT.-The
defendant had been divorced from a former husband on the grounds of
adultery, the statute providing that the guilty party should not m.arry again
during the life of the other party without the consent of the court given
under certain conditions, and such remarriage should be absolutely void.
The ·defendant married the plaintiff without the consent of the court. Upon
discovery of the facts above the husband, the plaintiff, 'sued for annullment.
Held, that the marriage should be annulled. Roth v. Roth (1916), 161 N.
Y. Supp. gg.
The case raises the interesting question whether a court of equity has
inherent power to annul a marriage which is absolutely void under the
s~fllte. The couit says that it has, but prefers to base its holding upon the
statutory ground of fraud, which existed in this case. Peugnet v. Phelps,
48 Barb. 566, under facts practically identical with those in "the principal case,
except that the husband in that case knew of his wife's statutory disability
before marriage holds that the court had no inherent power to annull
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the marriage even though it were void under the statute and so annullment
was refused in that case. In many cases the New York courts have been
quite ready to interfere with the marriage relation upon the ground of general equity jurisdiction. It was declared in early cases that the court of
chancery might annull marriages on the grounds of insanity and fraud without statutory warrant. Wightman v. Wightman, S Johns. Ch. 343; Ferlat
v. Gojon, I Hopk. Ch. 478. In Burtis v. Burtis, I Hopk. Ch. 557, the general
jurisdiction of the court of equity to annull marriages was restricted by holding that it extended only to matters' affecting, contracts in general and <!id
not include the powers of the English Ecclesisatical courts. This lias since
been the rule in New .York. Dam dson v. Ream, 161 N. Y. Supp. 73. In
Griffin v. Griffin, 47 ~. Y. 134, the wife was given counsel fees by the court
under its inherent power as a court of equity without statutory warrant
where her husband had sued to annull the marriage and had failed to establish his case. In Berry v. Berry, II4 N. Y. Supp. 497, the court held that
under its inherent powers as a court of equity it would refuse annullment
of a marriage to a guilty party even though the express words of the statute
would seem to authorize annullment at the suit of. either party. The courts
of other states, having general equity jurisdiction have, as a rule, granted
annullment upon grounds of insanity, fraud and duress without statutory
warrant. Avakian. v. Avakian., 6g N. J. Eq. 8g; Carris v. "Carris, 24 N. J. Eq.
516; Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 400, In Davis v.
Whitlock, 90 S. C. 233, the marriage was void under a statute and the court
held that it had inh!!rent power to declare it so, as this would relieve the
parties of the uncertainty as to their status, and remove any cloud from title
which uncertainty as to mi1:rriage status might put there.
0

BANKRUPTCY-ENFORCJ;MtNT oF LitNS AFTtR BANKRUPTCY.::._More than
four months before bankruptcy the bankrupt gave ~ security deed to land
which, after adjudication, the lien creditor, without the consent Qf the bankruptcy court, sold at public auction in accordance with the terms of the deed.
Held, that the sale did not divest the title"of the trustee.. Cohen v. Nixon &
Wright, 236 Fed. 407.
The filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in effect, an
attachment and injunction, Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 14 but only as
to parties who have no substantial claim of a lien or title to the property
claimed as that of the bankrupt. Until the property is in the custody or control, actual or constructive, of. the receiver in bankruptcy, or of the trustee,
marshal, referee, or (after filing of the bankruptcy petition) of the bankrupt or his agent, it is not in custodia legis for the purpose of "assumption
of jurisdiction" by the· bankruptcy court. See lli;MING'tON, BANKRUP'rCY,
§18o7, for discussion and citation of cases. In re Rathman, 183 Fed. 913, 1o6
C. C. A. 253; York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344 352, 353, 26 Sup. Ct.
924 100 C. C. A. 253; Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 2o6 U. S. 28, 27
Sup. Ct. 681, 51 L. Ed. 945; Jacqueth v. Rowley, 188 U. S. 620, 625, 23 Sup.
Ct. 36g, 47 L. Ed. 620. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gaskell, 195 Fed. 865. Hence
the statement in Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Co., 222 U. S. 301, 32 Sup.
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Ct. g6, 56 L. Ed. 208, that the filing of the bankruptcy petition is itretf an
assumption of jurisdiction is too broad. In the principal case the bankrupt
was in possession after the filing of the petition, the property was therefore
in custodici legis, and the sale by the lien creditors without the sanction of
the bankruptcy court was void. In re Epstein, 156 Fed. 42, 17 L. R. A. N. S.
465. The court in the principal case declined to foltow Hiscock v. Varick
Bank, in which a sale by the pledgee, prior to adjudication and subsequent
to the petition, was held valid, on the ground that the pledgee had had title to
and possession of the pledged policies more than two years before the filing
of the petition. As a matter of fact, the title of the pledgee was not that
of absolute owner, but was almost identical with that held by the lien creditor
in the principal case. The true ground of distinction would seem to be that
the lien property was not in etistodia legis within the meaning of the rule laid
down supra. The Hiscock case might, in the light of subsequent decisions,
be criticized for its dictum that though the trustee's title vests as of the
date of adjudication, it does not "relate back to the commencement of the
proceedings in bankruptcy."
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF SUPREME CoURT.-A direct appeal was made
to the Supreme Court of the United States from a decree of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, adjudging appellee not a bankrupt. On
the ground that this case was not a "controversy arising in bankruptcy proceedings," the ·writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Swift &
Co. et al v. Hoo11er; (1916), 37 Sup. Ct. -.
The"mode of appeal in a given case depends upon whether the case presents a proceeding or step in bankruptcy or whether it is a "controversy arising in bankruptcy proceedings." Coder v. Aris, .213 U. S . .2.23, .234- In the
latter case alone can there be an .appeal to the Supreme .Court of the United
States as provide<!. by § 24-a, since Congress has "failed to give· an appeltate
review in 'proceedings in bankruptcy' * * * from a decree with reference t<>
an adjudication in bankruptcy." "There is a clear distinction between 'controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings' as mentioned in § 24a, and the
'proceedings in bankruptcy' which by § 24b, the Circuit Court of Appeals are
given jurisdiction to superintend and· revise 'in matter of law': the former
being generalty held to embrace questions between the trustee, representing
the bankrupt and his creditors, on the one side, and adverse claimants, on
the other, and not directly affecting those administrative orders and judgments ordinarily known as 'proceedings in bankruptcy' ; and the latter being
confined to those questions arising between the bankrupt and his creditors
which are the very subject of such administrative orders and judgments,
from the petition for adjudication to the discharge, and including the intermj!diate administrative steps, and such controversies as arise :between the
parties to the bankruptcy p_roceedings as are involved in the altowance of
cl:µtjls, flxing their priorities, sales altowances, and other matters to be dispos~d of summarily." Thompscm v. Mauzy, 174 Fed. 6u. An adjudication
of bankruptcy or a refusal to adjudicate, Denver First Nat. Bank v. Klug~
186 U. S. 202, 22 Sup. Ct. 8gg, 46 L. Ed. 1127; a judgment granting or deny-
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ing a discharge, Thompson v. Mauzy, 174 Fed. 6n; an order of allowance or
disallowance of costs and expenses of administration-such as trustee's attorney's fees, Davidson Co. v. Friedman, 140 Fed. 853; a contest over a claim
and lien, In re Loving, 224 U. S. 183; are "proceedings in bankruptcy'' as
contra-distinguished from "controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings.''
If, however, the sole controversy is about the lien or priority and not about
the debt, Coder v. Arts, supra (dictum), or if the trustee petitions for an
order upon a third party, the bankrupt or bis voluntary assignee, to surrender property in their possession belonging to the estate, 11~ re H eco~, 164
Fed. 823; Delta National Bank v. Easterbrook, 133 Fed. 521; Hinds v. Morse,
134 Fed. 231 ; it is a "controversy arising in bankruptcy proceedings" claiming property in the custody of the bankruptcy court Liddon & Bros. v.
Smith, 135 Fed. 43; Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, and Armstrong v.
Fernandez, 2o8 U. S. 324 in which the United States Supreme Court reviewed
"proceedings in bankruptcy," are qualified and limited by the decision in
Tefft-Weller & Co. v. Mun.mri, 222 U.S. II4
I

BANKRUP'tCY-P~Nct

IN ENFORCJ<;M£NT OF -LmN.-More than four
months before his bankruptcy A gave bills of site-of personaltY, of which
he retained possession, as collateral security for indorsements by the pledgee,
creating an equitable lien in the latter's favor, and within the four months'
period sold the property and paid the proceeds to the pledgee. Held, that
the enforcement, within four months -of bankruptcy, of a lien acquired prior
to that period did not constitute a preference which could be set aside by
the trustee in bankruptcy. Davis v. Billings (Pa. 1916), 99 Atl. 163.
The enforcement of a lien obtained more than four months prior to the
filing of the petition by taking possession and selling within the four months'
period (Woods v. Klein, 223 Pa. St 256, 265, 72 Atl. 523, 524; First Nat.
Bank v. Lanz, 202 Fed. n7, 120 C. C. A. 275) or by merely taking possession
'(Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldowney, 207 Fed. 255, 262, 124 C. C. A. 641) does
not constitute an illegal preference; nor -does an execution and sale within
such period under a judgment recovered prior thereto, and operating as a
lien on real estate (Owen v. Brown, 120 Fed. 812, 57 C. C. A. 18o}, nor taking possession where _required by the state law in order to perfect the lien
as against third persons or the trustee (Thompson v. Fairbanks, 1g6 U. S.
516, 25 Sup. Ct 3o6, 49 L. Ed. 577; Humphrey v. Tatman, 1g8 U. S. 93, 25
Sup.-Ct. 568, 49 L. Ed. 956; Coggan v. Ward, 215 Mass. 13, 102 N. E. 336).
But a lien created within the four months' period by levy, attachment, or
otherwise is invalid under o§67f. Metcalf Bros. & Co. v. Barker, 187 U. S.
165, 23 Sup. Ct 67, 47 L. Ed. l22j In re Ferguson, 95 Fed. 429. If the transfer
is recorded within the four months' period and "-by law such recording or
registering is required" (§6oa) within the meaning of Carey v. Donohue, 240
U. S. 430, 36 Sup. Ct 386, and Bunch v. Maloney, 233 Fed. g67, it would, under
the circumstances of the principal case, be voidable by the trustee under
§6ob. Martin v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 228 Fed. 651, 143 C. C. A. 173;
Deupree v. Watson, 216 Fed. 483, 132 C. C. A. 543. Recording of the instru-
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ment was not "required" in the principal case, hence this point was not considered. See IS MICH. L. Rsv. 6g and I4 MICH. L. Rsv. S78 for discussions
of Carey v. Donohue and Bunch v. Maloney.
BII.Ls AND NOTts:-AccoMMODATION Co-MA.KER NOT DISCHARG!U> BY ExTtNsioN oF TIMr: oF PAYMJO;NT.-Defendant was an accommodation co-maker
on a promissory note. Plaintiff, payee of the note, had knowledge of this
relatibn when the note was made. In suit upon the note, held that under
§§n9 and I20 of the N:EGOTIABI.JO; INSTRUMl';NTS ACT an extension of time
granted to the principal debtor by the payee for a valuable consideration was
no defense and would not release the defendant as accommodation co-maker.
Graham v. Shepherd'(Tenn. I9I6), I8g S. W. 867.
Prior to the N:EGOTIABI.E INSTRUMENTS ACT the general rule regarding comakers of a note was that one signing for the accommodation of another
was discharged hy an extension of time given the principal debtor, if for
value, and if the holder had knowledge of the true relation between the comakers. Ward v. Stout, 32_Ill. 399; Harris v. Brooks, ;<!I Pick. I9S; Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 4S7;.Barron v. Cady, 40 Mich. 2s9; White v. Whitney, SI Ind. 124 This was on the ground that the relation of principal and
surety .. exists between the accommodated party and the ac.commodation
maker, at least so far as their own interests are concerned, and a holder
with knowledge must "respect that relationship. Cummings v. Little, 4S Me.
I83; State Bank v. SmiiJh, 1ss N. Y. I8S; Parker v. Ingrmn, 22 N. H. 283.
But five states refused t<> allow the accommodation party to set up this defense. Bull v. Allen, I9 Conn. IOI; Yates v. Donaldson, S Md. 38g; Anthony
v. Fritz, 4S N. J. L. I; Farrington v. Gallaway, IO Oh. St. 543; Stroop V.·
McKenzie, 38 Tex. 133. This almost universal rule of the common law
based upon the equitable rules of suretyship as applied to negotiable instruments has been overthrown by the Nr;cOTIAl!I.E INSTRUMENTS Ar:r, according
to the decisions of the courts of the states where the question has arisen
since the adoption of that la.;.,. They reason that, sipce a co-maker is by
the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay the same, he is ·a
party primarily liable under §140 of the law. §u9 gives the methods whereby
a negotiable instrument may be discharged; §120 those whereby a party
secondarily liable may be discharged. The. defense relied upon by the defendant in the principal case falls under §I20 and ~ot under §u9,· henc~ the
defendant being primarily liable is not discharged. The courts have uniformly held that the methods of discharge specified are exclusive. Bank V·
Williams, I64 Ky. 143, I7S S. W. Io; Union Trust Co. v. McGfoty, 2I2 Mass.
20s, g8 N. E. 679; Bank v. Douglas, I78 Mo. App. 664, IOI S. W. 6oI; Richards v. Bank Co. 81 Oh. St. 348, go N. E. IOOO; Cellars v. Meachern, 49 Ore.·
I86, I3 Ann. Cas. 997; Vanderford v. Farmers' Bank, IOS Md. I64, 66 Atl. 47;
Walstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah,· 300, 97 Pac. 329; Bradley Co. v. Heyburn,
s6.-Jlash. 628, Io6 Pac. I70; CitizeM Bank v. Toplitz, 81· App. Div. S93, 81
N. Y. Supp. 422 (affirmed in I78 N. Y. 464 on another ground, the court refusing to pass on the question raised in the court below). In Iowa it has
been held that when the question arises between the original parties to the
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,iote, as in the principal case, the payee is not to be considered a holder in
due course and therefore that the provisions of the NtGOTIAm.~ INSTRUMENTS
Ac:r do not apply. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snoufler, I39 Iowa I7(), II7
N. W. 50. Three states, Illinois, Kansas,. Wisconsin, have refused to adopt
§§n9 and I20 in the form recommended. See BRANNAN, NI!GO'l'. INs'.l'R. LAW
(2 Ed.) 120, I58. '!'his law was not intended to state all the changes the law
of suretyship might lead to in the law of bills and notes, and it has been contended that the law does not necessarily upset the established rules of
suretyship, BRANNAN, N:iiGOT. INS'.l'R. LAW (2 Ed.) n7, 26 HARV. L. R:iiv. 596,
but in view of the almost uniform interpretation of the sections under consideration and the purpose of the law as a whole, it would seem better to
adopt the rule of the principal case and leave any needed alterations ,to legislative amendment. See 5 MtcH. L. R:iiv. 683, and 8 MICH. L. IU;v. 6oo for
a discussion of earlier cases.
Bu.r.s AND Non:s-R.IGH'.rS oF DoN:iit oF A SUNDAY N~-A note was executed on Sunday in violation of the Sunday laws, but was dated on a secular
day. After maturity the payee of the note gave it to his grandson, who had
no notice of the illegality of its inception. In suit .by him on the note, held
the donee is entitled to recover, since as an 'innocent transferee he was not
in pari delicto with either of the parties, and to'pemiit'the maker of the note·
to defeat it in the hands of an innocent holder would allow him to take
advantage of his own wrong. Gooch v. Gooch (Iowa Ig16), x6o N. W. 333.
The making of a note on Sunday is a violation o.f the laws of Iowa, Sayre
v. Wheeler, 31 Iowa IIZ; Pike v. 4ing, 16 Iowa 49, but such viofation does not
make the note void but voidable. Mcintosh v. Lee, 57 Iowa 356, IO N. W.
895; Collitls v. Collins, I39 Iowa 703. Where such vio1ation makes the note
merely voidable it is· held that if the note appears on its face to have been
made on secular day a holder in due course may enforce it.. Clinton Nafl
Bank v. Graves, 48 Iowa 228; Cra~oti v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439; Bank v. Thompsoii,-42 N. H. 370; Myers v. Kessler, I42 Fed. 73, 74 C. C. A. 62; Knox v.
Cliflord, 38 Wis. 651, 20 Am. Rep. 28. And although the ·transfer is made
after maturity, the maker has no equity against a holder for a valuable consideration without notice, for it is only against a person in equal fault that
the defendant can be allowed. to urge his own turpitude. L11ightman v.
Kadetska, 58 Iowa 676, 43 Am. Rep. 129; Johns v. Bailey, 45 Iowa 241;
Harrison v. Powers, 76 Ga. 218; Gordon v. Levine, 197 Mass. 263, 83 N. E.
861; DANn:r.s, NtGOT. INS'l'. §70 (note). The court in the principal case
extends the doctrine and,holds that since the transfer of the note by gift
supported by the good, though not valuable, consideration of blood relationship passed the title of the note to the donee, and as the latter acquired his
rights without notice, the rule ex turpi causa non oritur actio will not avail
to protect the wrongdoer, but he will be estopped to deny the validity of
the instrument against the innocent holder when he by hi!! own act gave it
such character.

a

CoMMON LAW MAfuuAGt-N~SI'.rY OF CoHABI'.rA'J.'ION '.rO CoNS'J.'I'.rU'.rt.Plaintiff and defendant were married in New Jersey, without a license, by a

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Justice of the Peace. After they had lived together about a week the defendant (husband) left the plaintiff, who later brought a collusive suit as a
result of which the marriage was annulled. The plaintiff now seeks to have
the decree of annullment set aside. Held, that a valid common law marriage
had taken place, even though a license is required in New Jersey, and the
.decree of annullment was set aside. Davidson v. Ream (N. Y. 1916), 161
N. Y. Supp. 73.
Although parties are married without the license required by statute, the
marriage will be valid if consummated, provided that the words of the statute
do not expressly declare such a marriage void. State v. Bittick, 103 Mo. 183;
State v. Parker, lo6 N. C. 7II ; Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173; Dmnaresly v.
Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 368. •Many interesting questions were discussed
by the court in reaching the above decision. The court said that a contract
per verba de presenti is sufficient to constitute a valid common law marriage
though not followed by cohabitation, and cites cases to support it. This is a
disputed point. Many cases have said that the simple contract is sufficient,
but the exact question has generally not been involved in the decision. The
cases cited by the court in this case do not involve a decision of the exact
question. In Jackson ex ·dem v. Winne, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 47, there was an
actual ceremonial marriage. In F?nton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 51; Caujolle v.
Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90; Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 57 Barb. 23s; Davis v. Stouffer,
132 Mo. App. SSS; and Bey v. Bey, 83 N. J. Eq. 239, 90 Atl. 68S, it appeared
that' there had bt;en an actual consummation of the marriage by cohabitation
after the contract of marriage per verba de presenti. In Clayton v. Wardell;
4 N. Y. 230, there had been cohabitation without a contract of marriage. In
Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry, 20 Fed. 281, it does not appear whether:
or not cohabitation took place after the written contract of marriage. The
piarriage was held valid. In the cases sometimes cited to support the above
proposition, Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391; Topper v. Perry, 197 Mo. 531;
Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484; Carey v. Hulett, 66 Minn. 327, there was cohabitation either with or without a previous contract of marriage by words of
present contract. Davis v. Davis, 7 Daly. (N. Y.) 3o8, presents the question
squarely and a marriage was held to be valid, although the ceremony was
not sufficient to constitute a statutory marriage, nor was it followed by cohabitation. Herd v. Herd, 6g So. 88S, 14 MICH. L. Rsv. 26o reaches an opposite conclusion and a marriage ceremony performed after secus:ing an invalid license and not followed by cohabitation was held not to constitute a
marriage. Ashley v. State, 109 Ala. 48, also reaches the same conclusion upon
similar facts.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DSFRAUDING GoVllRNM£NT.-Accused obtained a. contract from the manager of the commissary department of the Panama Railroad Company to supply said company with a certain quantity of tobacco
anc!.agreed to and did pay over to the manager one-half of the profits which
he had made through the contract. Defendant was indicted under §37 of
Penal Code (Act March 4. 1909, c. 321, 3S Stat. log6, Comp. St. 1913 §10201),
which provides : "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any of-
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fense against the United States or to defraud the United States in any
manner or for any purpose and one or more of such parties do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to the conspiracy
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both." Held, that when the United States enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity, and is to be treated
like any other corporation; therefore, though it absolutely owns the Panama
Railroad Company, and is the only one profiting or losing by the railroad
company's activities, a conspiracy to defraud 'the railroad company is· not
a conspiracy to defraud the United States. Salas v. United States, 234 Fed.
&j2.

The case came up on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second District, from the District Court for the Southern District of New York, where
the defendant wa5 convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States.
United States v. Burke, et al., 221 Fed. IOI4- Upon appeal, the Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court, finding that there
was no conspiracy to commit~ any offense against the United States. In
arriving at this conclusion the court relied strongly on the case of Bank
of United States v. Plantet's Bank, 9 Wheat; 904. 6 L. Ed. 244. which had
decided that a bank is not exempt from suit under the eleventh amendment
because a part of its capital stock is owned by a state. In this case, MARSHALL, C. J., in the course of his opinion stated, "It is, we think, a sound
principle that when a. government becomes a partner in
trading com.pany, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company,
of its sovereign character and takes that of a private citizen." Thus, in
reliance on the preceding case, it has been held that the fa~ tliat South
Carolina was a member of a certain railroad company did not oust the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How.
550, 551, II L. Ed. 375; that the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Company was not
entitled, by reason of the state being a shareholder, to exercise any larger
rights than were given by its charter, Brady v. State, 26 Md. 302; that debts
due to a bank wholly owned by the state are not entitled to priority under
an insolvency law, Fields v. Creditors, I Sneed.~·354- Two of the three
judges, WARD and Co~ considered that the opinion of Chief Justice MARSHALL in Bank of Unit~d States v. Planters' Bank, supra, might be relied
on as decisive of the present case, that the United States in operating the
Panama Canal was engaged in a commercial business and had abandoned
its sovereign capacity, and therefore a crime against the Panama Railroad Company was not a crime against the United States. CHATFIEI.n, J.,
dissenting, considered that the Panama Railroad Company was a department under the Isthmian Canal Commission, -an agency of the United States,
and therefore defrauding the Panama Railroad Company was not a crime
against a private corporation, but a crime against the United States.

any

CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PROTf:C'tION oF LAws-INTr:RSTATS CoM:MERC£.-The plaintiff railroad company is a consolidated corporation, existing by virtue of the consolidation, under concurrent acts of the states of
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Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama, of three independent and distinct railroad corporations created by and formerly operating solely within the respective states named. By the specific language of §12 of the Alabama
RtvENUS Ar:r an annual franchise tax ibased upon the amount of paid-up
capital stock is exacted of "All corporations organized under the laws of
this state:'' On the other hand, the franchise tax exacted of "all corporations organized under the laws of any other state, nation, or territory, and
doing business in this state," was based upon the "actual amount of capital
employed in this state." Plaintiff in error sues to recover certain sums
of money which it had paid under protest, having been ·taxed on its entire
capital stock. Held, the tax was properly levied. Kansas City, Memphis
& Birmingham R.R. Co. v. Stiles (1916), 37 Sup. Ct. 58.
When the three distinct and independent corporations, each chartered by
a separate state, consolidated under the laws of Alabama into one corporation, this corporation was as much subject to and dependent upon the will
of that state as if the corpoiators had been citizens of the state. Ashley v.
Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 442, 14 Sup. Ct. 865, 38 L. Ed. 773; Quincy Railroad
Bridge Co. v. Adams Co., 88 Ill 615. By receiving a grant of corporate existence from the state of Alabama, .the corporation voluntarily made itself
supject to the laws of that s·tate and cannot now be heard to complain
against an annual tax based upon the amount of capital stock of said corporation. The Railroad Company r~ied on the decision in Southern Railway
v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287, 54 L. Ed. 536, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247,
in which it was field that an additional franchise tax imposed upon foreign·
corporations and not upon dome5tic ones engaged in the same business,.
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws. But here the state has
made no arbitrary classification. True, the consolidated corporation owns
property outside of the state, while many other corporations chartered by
the state are doing solely an intrastate business; but a franchise tax based
upon the capital stock is not thereby rendered arbitrary. Nor does this tax
amount to a regulation of interstate commerce. Where a state taxes a
foreign corporation, doing an intrastate and also an interstate business, a
certain percentage of fts capital stock as a condition of continuing to do
local business in the state such exaction may amount to an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. l,
30 Sup. ci. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 30 Sup.
Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 378. But this is not the case of a state demanding a certain tax from a foreign corporation as a privilege of doing business in the
state; it is the case of a state taxing a corporation chartered undei' its own·
laws, a corporation which had agreed to this taxation by filing its incorporation papers. A state has authority to tax a domestic corporation for
the privilege of being a corporation, .and such a tax is not necessarily invalid because measured by the capital stock, part, of which may represent
ca~ital not subject to the taxing po\'\er of the state. Kansas City, etc. R.R.
v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 36 Sup. Ct. 261, 6o L. Ed. 617. See also 9 MICH.
L. IU:v. 555.
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CoRPORATIONS-El1etCT 011 Smuuo:ND:eit 011 CHAR'n:R.-A voltintary unincorporated fraternal organization incorporated under the laws of New Jersey.
Later the charter was voluntarily surrendered under the laws of that state
and a new charter obtained in Pennsylvania. ·The Supreme Court of Penn.sylvania held that the former status of the organization was revived by
the surrender of the charter. Schriner, et al. v. Sachs, et al (Pa. 1916), g8
Atl. 724The same facts were presented before the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, which held that the former status was not revived 'by the surrender
'of the charter. Doan v. Jones, et al. (N. J. 1916), 99 Atl. 192.
The line of argument in the Pennsylvania case is that the
of incorporation merely gave a new form to the organization already existent, citing Commonwealth ex rel v. Heilman, 241 Pa. 374 (1913), and concluding from that
premise that the slOughing of the corporate form did not destroy the organization itself, but returned it to its former status. The New Jersey case points out
that the corporation went through the statutory forms of .dissolution and
concludes that both under the terms of the statute and ' 1the ad~quate con'ception of the effect of incorporation and the force of. dissolution" thei:e
was a total determination of the organization except for the payment of debts:
The court cites no authority. and expressly disapproves of :the Pennsyl\rania
case, which was cited by counsel. The point involved seems a new one. We
submit that the New Jersey court ·begs the 'question insofar as its decision
is based upon the nature and effect of dissolution. There is no issue as to.
the corporation being determined by dissolution, bu~ the point raised is
what is it that is determined! In other words the Pennsylvania court prO:
ceeds upon the hypothesis that incorporation effects a mere change in farm
which process may be reversed, while the New Jersey court assumes that
incorporation results in a progressive evolution of the very entity of the
organization, which cannot be later made to wc,rk retrogressively. None
,of the stock theories as to corporations precisely me~ts the situatiol} and it
seem:? that an interesting field of speculation is opened up.
· ·

act

CoRPoRATio~s-PnsoNAr. LIABILI'tY oF SToCKHOI.DSRS 011 UNRtGIS'.l'ERtD
FoI®:GN CoRPORATION.-The defendants are stockholders in a foreign cor_poration which · had carried on business in the' state without having attempted to comply with the statutory registration require.ments as to such
corporations. The plaintiffs, who had been employed by the corporation, are
seeking to hold the stockholders liable as partners for the amounts due
them. Held, the defendants are liable as partners. Cunnyngliam v. Shelby
(Tenn. 1916), 188 S. W. u47.
It is almost universally held that, where a foreign corporation fails to
comply with the statutory requirements of the state, its contracts are not
void but voidable, and may be enforced against the corporation. The corporation may not set up its non-compliance as a defense. Ins. Co. v. Rust,
141 Ill. 85, 30 N. E. 772; Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 24 Oh. St. 67; Ins. Co. v.
Simons, g6 Pa. St. 520. The instant case presents the question whether,
having dealt with the corporation as a valid corporation, the plaintiffs ~ay

352

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

set up the non-compliance and deny the validity of the corporate existence,
and thereby bold the stockholders liable as ·partners. The court reasons
that the foreign corporation, having made no attempt to comply with the
statutes, has no legal sanction to operate within the state and hence bas no
legal existence within the state at all, and having none bas no standing before the courts as a corporation for the enforcement of any right, as the
existence of the corporation cannot ibe recognized. Such being the case the.
stockholders, having associated themselves together and carried on a business for profit, are partners and cannot rely upon their corporate existence
in another state as a cloak to relieve them of their liability as such. The
court relies upon Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. 552, 39 L. R. A. 362;
Mandeville v. Courtwright, 142 Fed. 97, 73 C. C. A. 321, 6 L. R. A. N. S.
1003; Morion v. Hart, 88 Tenn. 427, 12 S. W. 1026; Carter v. McCfare, g8
Tenn. 109, 38 S. W. 585, 36 L. R. A. 282. The weight of authority, how~ver, ~eems to support the view that the bare fact that a foreign corporation has not complied with the state registration statutes is not sufficient to
authorize a judgment against the stockholders as partners Oil contracts executed in the name of the corporation. Nat'l Bank v. Spot Cash Coal Co.,
g8 Ark. 59; Boyington v. Van Etten, 62 Ark. 63, 35 S. W. 622; Tribble v.
Halbert, 143 Mo. App. 524; Merrick.v. Van Sanwoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Stephenson v. Dodson, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 343; Bond v. Stroughton, 26 Pa. Super.
Ct. 483; Leschen Rope Co. v. Moser (Tex. Civ. App.), 159 S. W. 1018. It is
well settled that such liability may be imposed upon the stockholders· by
statute, Kendall v. Bank, 19 Colo. 310, 35 Pac. 538; Hunnewell v. Duxbury,
154 Mass. 286, 28 N. E. 267; Chesley v. Soo &c. Co., 19 N. D. 18; Goldsbe"y
v. Carter, 100 Va. 438, 41 S. E. 858, and it seems clear that where the corporate existence is effected in another state purely for the purpose of defeating personal li\lbility, such is a fraud upon the state which prevents a
valid incorporation and therefore the stockholders may be held liable as
partners. Cleaton v. Emery, 49 IMo. App. 345; Daviclson v. Hobson, 59 Mo.
App. ,;30; Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31; Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass.
249, 19 N. E. 342. It has also been held that an agent who has actually entered into contracts for such a· corporation may be held personally liable on
the ground that the corporation, having no power to transact business within
th_e state, can delegate none to the agent, and one whp undertakes to act
for such a principal and represents himself to have such power when in
fact be bas none, is personally responsible. M orl01i v. Haff, 88 Tenn. 427,
12 S. \V. 1026; Raff v. Isham, 235 Pa. St. 347, 84 Atl. 352; Lasher v. Stinson,
145 Pa. St. 30, 23 Atl. 552. In the absence of such a· statute and of fraud
in the incorporation of the· company, and where the stockholder has not personally actively engaged in the actual business, it is not so clear that the
partnership liability should be imposed upon him. It seems clear that the
other party to the contract never intended to look to him in case of any
damage or loss resulting. When be entered into the contract it was the
c~~l>oration as such that he had in mind. He has his remedy against the
corporatfon on the contract either in his own state as shown above orcontract actions be:ing transitory-in the courts of the parent state of the
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corporation. Non-compliance of the corporation in no .way affects the
validity of the existence of the corporation, Rough. v. Breitung, n7 Mich.
48, 75 N. W. 147, and a corporate franchise granted by one state may not be
revoked or annulled by the courts of another, Merrick v. Van Santvoord,
supra. Hence it would appear that where a party has recognized the validity
of the corporation by dealing with it as such knowingly he should be estopped
from setting up its non-compliance with the registration requirements as a
means to fasten a personal liability upon the stockholders of the company,
unless there is a statute which strips the compant· of its corporate character. Mandeville v. Courtwright, supra. The above case was relied upon
by ~he court in ~e principal case in coming to an opposite conclusion, but
it should be noticed that it was expressly found that the plaintiff had no
knowledge that she was dealing with a corporation, a,nd that the court makes
no comment in reViewing the instruction of the trial court that if the plaintiff
dealt with the corporation with knowledge she would be estopped to deny
its power to act, and would be precluded from holding the shareholders
liable as partners. Taylor v. Branham, supra, the only other cal!e concerning
the liability of stockholders cited by the court in the principal case{ is an
unsatisfactory report and it is not clear on what circumstance the eourt
rests its decision.
· ·
CouNTatCI.AI:r.i:-WHtN BARR~ IN EQUITY BY THE STATUTE oF Lni:nATroNs.-Complainant was a stockholder in defendant corporation, and brought
a bill in equity to compel payment" of his dividends and a transfer of his
stock to his vendee upon the defendant's books. The defendant in its
cross-bill insisted that the plaintiff pay to the !iefendant a certain counterclaim, which, however, was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The
lower court refused· to give effect to the counterclair and allowed the com-'
,plainant the relief sought. Held, this decree should be reversed and case
·remanded for new trial in which, the.counterclaim should be allowed: United
Cigarette Mach. Co. v• .Brown (Va. 1916), 8g S. E. 851.
In the principal case the defendant company had a lien on all its stock
for the debts of the stockholders by virtue of a clause in the articles of
incorporation. The fact that the Statute of Limitations has barred an
action by the corporation on its claim will ·not destroy the lien upon the
stock. Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596, 9 L. Ed. 547; Sproul v.
Sta.ndard Plate Glass Co., 201 Pa. 103, 50 Atl. 1003; CooK, CoRPORATIONS
(7th Ed.), §527· The decision in the principal case might have been put
on this ground alone. How:ever, the court assigns a,s an additional reason
for giving effect to the counterclaim, the principle of equity, soml'times expressed in the maxim, "He who seeks equity· must' do equity." If relief is
granted on this theory, the existence of the defendant's lien .is immaterial.
In case the plaintiff brings an action at law, a counterclaim or set-off barred
by the Statute 'of Limitations is inadmissible. Taylor v. Gould, 57 Pa. St. 152,
WATS.MAN, SET-OFF (2nd Ed.), §99. The rule is different in equity; if
there is an equitable right to which the defendant is entitled, the court will
make it a condition precedent to the granting of the relief sought by the
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complainant that he should grant to the defendant such equitable relief even
though there is no right at common law. This principle is applicable to cases
in equity in which the Statute of Limitations has barred the debt or claim
which the defendant seek~ to use as a set-off. Dewalsh v. Braman, I6o l11.
4I5, 43 N. E.; Tracy v. Wheeler, IS N. D. 248, I07 N. W. 68. It would appear then that the counterclaim should be given effect in equity regardless
of the lien of the defendant company.
CRIMINAL LAW-INntFINITS SusPSNSION oF StN'ttN~-'the accused,
pleading guilty to an indictment for embezzlement, was sentenced to imprisonment in -the penitentiary for five years, the shortest .term which could
be imposed upon him. At his reque5t, the court ordered "that the execution
of the sentence be, and it is hereby suspended during the good behavior of
the defendant, and for the purpose of this case this term of this court is
kept open for five years." Held, that mand~mus should issue directing the
judge to vacate the order of suspension, such issue to be stayed until the
end of the term to give ample time for executive clemency or such other
action as might be required to meet the situation. Ex Parle United States,
Petitioner, 37 Sup. Ct. 72.
To Justify such indefinite suspension, it is necessary to find that a court
has inherent judicial power ·to so act, either existing at common law or expre5sly given by statute. As there was no statute giving that power to the
court acting in the principal case, the validity of its decision must rest upon
common law principles. Decisions generally agree that a court has the
power to suspend or stay the execution of a sentence temporarily, for a reasonable time, pending an 1appeal, to allow the defendant to move for a new
trial, or for similar reasons, some of the holdings ·being based expressly on
a common law right. However, there is a direct conflict as to the right of
a court to suspend sentence indefinitely, the better rule and weight of authority apparently supporting the ruling of the principal case. For complete
citation of authorities on both sides of the question see-14 L. R A. 285,:
Note; 33 L. R A. N. S. u2, Note; 39 L. R A. N. S. 242, Note; L. R. A.'
19I5C n6g, Note.
'
EvmtNCS-Ntctssr'l'Y FOR ConoBORA'tION IN DrvoRCS AC'tION.~Flaintiff.
sued his wife for divorce on the ground of adultery, his testimony showed
clearly that he and his wife had been separated for more than four years
because of his wife's open misconduct in living with one Freddie as Freddie'~
wife. The court said, "The testimony in this case, if believed, and I see
no reason to doubt its truth, shows that ihe petitioner has a meritorious·
case," but there was no witness to corroborate the petitioner's statements,.
and the court .refused a decree, saying, "It is. an inflexible rule 1n this state:
that a divorce will not be granted upon uncorroborated testimony or admission of a p~rty to the suit. Not only does this apply to the cause but to
ev.~ element in the proofs necessary to sustain it." Garrett v. • Garrett
(N:). 19I6), g8 Atl. 848.
It was the practice in the Ecclesiastical Courts, the source of our common
law of divorce, that no divorce -could be granted on the uncorroborated con-
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fession or admissions of the parties, owing to the danger of fraud and
<:allusion or of coercion on the part of the husband.. This rule has been
generally adopted in this country either by the courts or by statute. The
New Jersey Courts have held to the doctrine in the instant case, that under
no consideration will a divorce be granted unles!I petitioner's testimony is
corroborated, but corroboration may :be made by the testimony of the defendant, when clear and manifestly without collision. Hague v. Hague (N.· J.
Eq.), g6 Atl. 579. Williams v. Williams, 78 N. J. Eq. 13, 85 Atl. 6u. Though
some cases seem to hold that it is sufficient corroboration if the circumstances, as shown by the expressions and conduct of the defendant,. sustain
the petitioner's testimony without any other witnesses. · Foote v. Foote, 71
N. J. Eq. 273, 65 Atl. 205. Where other circumstances show there can be
no collusion, or where the defendant vigorously fights· the case, so as to
leave no doubt as"-to the truth of the confession, or where confessions are
made under conditions precluding suspicion of collusion, the reason for
the rule demanding corroboration fails and most co1ttts give a decree in
accordance with Foote v. Foote, supra, even in states where statutes require corroboration, on the basis that where the statutes are in affirmance
of common law they are to be construed as was the rule at common law.
Burke v. Burke, 44 Kan. 307, 24 Pac. 466, 21 km. St. Rep. 283. The New
Jersey Courts go further than other courts in that they require corroborating evidence to every necessary element in the proofs, while other courts
hold it sufficient if the corroborating evidence tends to suppo"1 the complaint. Williams v. Williams, Bx N. J. Eq. 17~ 85 Atl. 6u; Hertz v. H.ertz,
126 Minn. 65, 147 N. W. 825; Allen v. Allen, 188 Mich. 532, 155 N. W. 488.
EvmtNCt--Rss G!lsTA£ IN .AlloRTioN.-On trial for abortion, it appeared
that the deceased woman went to defendant's home on February 7th, and
stayed till February 13th, when she returned to her mother's home; she returned to the defendant's home on February 15th and died there February
17th. The mother was allowed to testify to the declarations made by the
deceased on February 14th as to the -treatment given by defendant. The
lower court said to the jury, "if the abortion was complete at the time of
the declaration it was without probative effect; but if the abortion was at
the time incomplete it could be considered as a part of the res gestae." Held,
that the instruction was correct. State v. Newell (Minn•. 1916), 159 N.

W.829.

.

The case agrees in result with the majority of the decisions,-but different
<:ourts have given different reasons for admitting such evidence. In State v.
Hunter, 131 'Minn. 252, 154 N. W. 1o83, the court, admitting the evidence
on the basis of res gestae said, "Such declarations under particular restrictions are admissible when clearly sho'V{n to be part of the res gestae," and
quote from JoNss, CoMM. ON EV:, §344. as follows: ''This rule* * *is a
law unto itself, consisting·of many of the ordinary rules of evidence, but
primarily of relevancy; apparently setting at naught many of the exceptions, but in reality presenting a complete system of self-regulation to
meet the necessities and demands of complete proof." To the same effect
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is State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1II2, 63 L. R A. 902. In a recent
Michigan case hearsay evi.dence of statements of the deceased made as she
left the house to take a walk with the defendant were admitted as being
verbal a,cts. The court said, ''We are of opinion that it was competent to
prove her utterances made when she was leaving her home, and the neighbor's home, on Tuesday evening, not as evidence of the fact that she met
respondent, but as evidence of her intention to meet him, and explanatory
of her purpose i~ going away. Her utterances were in the nature of verbal
act,:;, accompaning the act of going away." People v. Atwood, 188 Mich. 36,
154 N. W. II2. Another line of cases admit the declarations of the woman,
on the theory of declarations made in furtherance of a consJ?iracy to commit an unlawful act. A woman may conspire with others to produce an
abortion upon herself, and the conspiracy being shown, her acts and declarations. in furtherance of the common design are evidence against others en·
gaged in the criminal ~ct, even though not spoken in their presence. The
Supreme Court of Iowa says, "Though she may not be guilty of committing
an abortion on herself, it is a crime for another to do so, and, if she conspires with others to perform the act, there is no escape from the conclusion that she is a conspirator, ~d her declarations in promotion o·f the
common enterprise are admissibl~ .in evidence against another conspirator
on trial for the commission of the substantive crime." State v. Cro/fMd, 133
Ia. 478, no N. W. 921. In Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48, the same doctrine
was announced. The i:ourt. said, "She may be, and usually is, a party to.
the iltegal-combinatioti to effect the abortion, and, as this is the ground upon·
which the declarations are submitted, it can make no difference that she is
not criminally liable for ·the act." Declarations made after the act is accomplished, except as dying declarations, are not admitted. People v. Hatz
261 Ill. 239, 103 N. E. 1007; Re~ v. Thompson [1912], 3 K. B. 19, Ann Cas.
1913A 530.
.
.INl!AN'l'S-BIIJ.S AND Nonts.-A millor was the payee of a note due upon
the date of his becoming· of age. His father, with the infant's consent;
endorsed the infant's name upon it and delivered it to the defendant, receiving the money for it. The defendant supposed the father was the owner
of the note. The money was invested and lost. The infant sued to recover
the note. No actual fraud was found on his part. The Nt:GO'l'IAllI,t INsmuHtN'l' Ac:r provides that: "The indorsement * * * of the instrument* * *
by an infant passes the property therein notwithstanding that from want of
capacity * * the infant may incur no liability thereon." Held that the
provision of 'the statute did not affect .the infant's right to disaffirm his
contract of indorsement and that he' should recover the note, Murray VJ
Thompson (Tenn. 1916), 188 S. W. 578.
· This seems to have been the first time that the question as to the infant's
right to disaffirm his contract of indorsement has come up since the passing
of the NtGOnABr.i lNS'.rRU:MtN'l'S Ac:r. The court states that this Ac:r merely.
settled the question as to whether the infant's indorsement was voidable or
void as to which there was considerable dispute. STORY, PROMISSORY Nons, §78.

*
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The NllGOTIAB~ INSTRUM£N'.I.' Ac:r makes the indorsei:nent voidable and not
void. The court says the Ac:r was not intended to pass the property from
the infant without the right of disaffirmance, and if the words were so
construed the endorsee could keep the note as against the infant even if
he knew the endorser was an infant when the note was indorsed. There
are very few cases upon this point. In Roach v. W ootlall, 9r Tenn. 200, the
guardian of an infant recovered a note from an indorsee when the infant's indorsement had been forged, the court saying by way of dictum
that the infant's indorsement is void. In Briggs v. McCabe, ZJ Ind. 327, the
infant payee recovered the note from the maker who had collusively paid
the note to the endorsee, it also appearing that the infant had not received
full value for the note. The court said that an infant might disaffir\D an
indorsement of a note without returning the proceeds or property received
by him. However, this case is distinguishable from the principal case, for
there appeared to be fraud as ·against the infant while in the principal case
there was no fraud against him. Hosler v. Beard, 54 Oh. St. 398, holds that
a bona fide holder of a note made by a lunatic is charged with constructive
notice' of the maker's disability, and says the same is true of· an infant's
note. McClain v. Davis, 77 Ind. 419, holds the same as regards the note of
an epileptic. Where there is
infant indorser it does not preclude the
indorser from recovering from the maker, even before the N~ INSTRUMEN'.l.'S Ac:r, Nightingale v. Withington, IS Mass. 272; Frazier v. Massey,
14 Ind. 382. Of course the infant· may not retain the proceeds until after
becoming of age and then disaffirm, Curry v. St. John Plow Co., SS Ill.
App. 82. But in the principal case the proceeds bad been lost, and the disaffirmance appears to have taken place before majority.

an

LANDLORD AND Tr:NAN'.l.'-Smuu;:NDr:R.-Defendant leased premises from
plaintiff, but abandoned them before the -expiration of the term. ·Plaintiff
notified d.efendant that the surren4er would not be accepted; that the
premises would be sublet, and the rent applied in mitigation of the damages.
Plaintiff relet in accordance with the notice, and now brings this action to
recover the damages suffered in excess of the amount received from the
new lease. Held, plaintiff should recover such damages a.ii were not extinguished by the proceeds from the "sublease." Rucker v. Mason (Okla.
1916), 161 Pac. l9S·
There is a surrender of a lease hy "act and operation of law" when transactions have taken place between landlord and tenant which create a condition of facts inconsistent with the continued operation of the lease. The
granting of a: s~cond lease is such a· transaction. By its execution the landlord asserts control over the premises. The legal effect of such control is
to deny the existence of the estate created by the old lease., The landlord's
protests of a contrary intention canriot change the color of bis acts. It is
the landlord who grants the new lease, not the defaulting tenant. To call
it a "sublease'' is fictional. There is no legal principle which permits one
to constitilte himself another's ag_ent in order to reduce certain damages for
which that other may be liable. The decisions holding that these facts show
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a surrender of the old lease are technica11y sound. Gray v. Kaiifman Dairy
&c. Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 56 N. E. 903; Biggs v. Stueler,.93 Md. 100, 48 Atl.
727. The late decisions support the principal case. The substantial effect
of such holdings is to deny the right of a defaulting tenant to escape the
consequences of his wrong by ·entrenching himself behind a sound legal
principle invoked by an act which would result to his benefit. Levy v. Burkstrom, 19i. 111. App. 478; Conner v. Warner (Okla. 1915), 152 Pac. 1n6;
Baldwin v. Lampkin, 14 Ga. App. 828, 82 S. E. 36g; Contratto v. Star Brewery
Co., 165 I1L App. 507; Zabriskie v. Sullivan, 8o N. J. L. 673, 77 Atl. 1075;
Boardman Realty Co. v. Carlin, 82 Conn. 413, 74 Atl. 682. The landlord
may protect himself in any jurisdiction by a stipulation in the lease which
permits him to re-rent the premises, and at the same time preserves his
right to recover any deficiency. But even here, the right to the sum due
after abandonment is contractual, and not, strictly speaking, for rent. Manhattan Realty Appraisers v. Marchbank, 149 N. Y. Supp. 834, 87 Misc. 336;
Grammes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 111. 634, 35 N. E. 820; Woodbury v.
Sparrell Print, 187 Mass.¢, 73 N. E. 547.
LIB~ AND SI.AND£R-WoRDs LIB!!I.OUS P£R S£.-Plaintiff and defendant
were engaged in.the undertaking business in the same town. Plaintiff a11eged
that the defendant printed and mailed to a man, whose wife was critica11y
ill at the time, a card bearing these words : "Bear in mind our Undertaking
Department.. Satisfaction guaranteed. (Signed) H. L. Hughes." Plaintiff
sued for libel and the defendant demurred. Held, that the demurrer should
be overruled. Hughes v. Samuels Bros. (Ia. 1916), 159 N. W. 58g.
The usual test in determining whether words are libelous per se is :
Are they such as to injure the plaintiff's reputation or his business? ToWNSH£ND, SLAND£R AND Lim:r. (3rd Ed.) 264- Judged by that standard the
words here used, taken :by themselves, would not be libelous. Stone v. Coqper.,
2 Denio 293;. Bennett v. Williamson, 4 Sandf. 6o. They become libelous,
however, because of the circumstances under which they were published,
and because of the effect which the publication would natura11y have upon
the mind of the person to whom a knowledge of the publication was brought.
But, although it is doubtful whether the words here used would formerly
have supported an action for libel, there can be no doubt that the decision
is justified. ,Th~ court puts it upon the broad ground that ,any intentional
injury of another, which cannot be justified, is a tort, and 1f the injury ia
committed by means of written words then it is a libel. See genera11y:
BIGl!I.OW, ToR'tS (8th Ed.), 297, .-298, note. See also, Wallace v. Bennett;
I Abb. N. C. 478; Bassell v. Elmore, 48 N._;t. 561; Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.
225.

s.

<

MuNicrPAJ. CoRPORA'tIONS-LIABn,ITY :E'OR N£Gr.IG£NCt-Pum.1c ~

'tIQNs.-The City of New Haven under the permissive authority of its charter
coi:ducted a Fourth of July celebration on a public green. The entertainment included a display of fireworks. The plaintiff's 'intestate was killed
by the expfosion of a bomb, a result alleged in the complaint to be due t~
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the negligence of the defendant. The latter demurred. Held, that the de..
murrer should be sustained on the ground that the city in holding the cele.bration was performing a governmental function and hence was not liable
for a negligent performance, as the act was not in itself intrinsically dangerous. Pope v. City of New Haven (Conn. l9I6), 99 Atl. SI.
That a city is not liable for the negligent performance of governmental
duties in general is well ,settled, 2 DILU>N, MuN. CoRP. (4th E<h), §949· See·
lS MlcH. L. Rr:v. l8o, 30 HARv. L. Rr:v. 270. put the fast that the duties
are governmental will not excuse the city if the act is in itself intrinsically
dangerous. Colwell v. Waterbury, 74 Conn. s68, SI Atl. s30; Speir v. Brooklyn, I39 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. 727. It has been held that where a municipality
has the power to give such a celebration as that in the instant case, if it is
exclusively for the gratuitous amusement of the public the municipality is
not liable. The aC::t in which it is engaged is solely for the general benefit
and interest of the public. Tindley v. City of Salem, I37 Mass. I7I, so Am.
Rep. 289; Kerr v. City of Brookline, 208 Mass. I90, 94 N. E: 2si. In some
cases the city has been held not liable on the ground that the entertainment
was an ultra vires act. Morrison v. City of Lawrence, g8 Mass. 219; Smith
v. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. so6. But,when a city maintains or author•
izes acts which constitute a nuisance it is liable for the damage caused,
Mootry v. City of Danbury, 4S Conn. sso, :29 Am. Rep. 703; Pennoyer v. Saginaw, 8 Mich. S34; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 36s; Vanderslice v. City of
Philadelphia, I03 Pa. St. I0:2, and at least in some jurisdictions it cannot
escape liability on the ground that it was performing a governmental ftinction. Sammons v. City of Gloversville, I7S N. Y. 346, 67 N. E. 622; Harl v.
Union County, S7 N. J. L. 90, :29 Atl. 490. Accordingly it has been held
where a city permits a public exhibition of fireworks in the city street the
jury may find it to be a nuisance, and in such case the city will J>e liable
for the damages resulting on the ground that it consented to the creation
of the nuisance. Landau v.: City of New York, I8o N. Y. 48, 72 N. E. 631;
S Peir v. City of Brooklyn, 139 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. 727; ·Moore v. City of Bloomington, SI Ind. App. I45, 95 N. E. 374- CQntra, on the ground that the case
involves no element of the alleged wrong except neglig!!nCe, and the condition
is not sufficiently permanent to constitute a nuisance. Kf!rr v. City of Brooklilie, supra. Where a city merely fails to prevent fireworks on a crowded
street the cityds not liable for personal injury resulting. Ball v. City of
Woodbine, 6I Iowa 83. City of M<1dtsonville v. Bishop, II3 Ky. xo6, 68
S. W. 269, which has been cited to the contrary, is based upon a statute.
A display of fireworks in a public park is not a nuisance per se but it is a
question for the jury. Landau v. City of New York, supra; De Agrammonte
v. Cit:v of Mt. Vernon, n2 App. Div. :2gI, g8 N. Y. Supp. 454
N:£GI.IGI":NC$-OF Fr:RRYMAN.-Plaintiff's intestate, who was a passenger on
defendant's steani ferry boat, was killed by drowning when an automobile
on the boat accidently started, ran forward and knocked decedent into the
river. It appeared that no practical barrier was provided by the defendant
to stop ~e progress of a car when once started. Held, the question of
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defendant's negligence should be submitted to the jury. Meisle v. New
York Cent. & H. R.R. Co. (N. Y. 1916), u4 N. E. 347.
This case is worthy of note, perhaps, principally on account of its peculiar
facts, although in the Appellate Division the complaint was dismissed on
the ground that there v.ras no evidence to justify a finding that the defendant
was negligent, or that it could have anticipated the accident. However, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is clearly right. A ferryman, like other
common carriers of passengers, is not an insurer of the passenger's safety,
but is required to exercise the highest degree of care, skill, and foresight
to protect him from injucy. · Lo·uisuille etc. Ferry Co. v. Nolan., 135 Ind.
6o, 34 N. E. 710; Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co., 52 N. Y. 32, 34. I I Am.
Rep. 650. If the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent
eye then it is not necessary that the defendant should have foreseen the
particular method in which the accident occurred. Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.
S. 150, 156, 34 Sup. Ct. 44, 45, 58 L. Ed.' 162; Washington & Georgetown R.
R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521, 526, 527. It is the duty of a public ferryman to provide suitable guards, barriers and fixtures of all kinds for the
security,of passengers. White v. Win.nisimmet Co., 7 Cush. 155; Whitmore
v. Bowman, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 148; Sanders v. Young, 38 T~ (1 Head)
219; 73 Am. Dec. 175; Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co., supra.
PLEADING-SP~CIAJ, D~.s->rs~ AS 'tO SUNDAY CoN'tRAct.-In an action against
a decedent's estate on a note made on Sunday, the defendant pleaded that
the note was illegaL ' After the court had directed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on pie ground
that "it conclusively appears· from the evidence that if said instrument was
executed and delivered by decedent, it was delivered on Sunday, March
1, 1914" No objection was taken to the use of a motion in arrest for an
error not apparent of record, but the motion was treated as a motion for a
new trial and overruled on the merits. .lfeld, that the defense to a note
that it was a Sunday contract was a special defense, within Cons SUPP. 1913,
§ 3340, requiring such defenses to be pleaded, that it was not sufficiently
pleaded. by the ·conclusion that "the note is illegal," but· the fact that it was·
made on Sunday must be alleged, and that such defense cannot 'be raised
for the first tim~ on a motion in arrest or ·for new trial. Rule v. Carey,
(Iowa 1916), 159 N. W. 6gg.
The same court has gone to the extent of holdi~g that a defendant who
has not raised the issue in his' answer may properly be. denied leave to
amend for that purpose pending the trial on the ground that "it is a clear
case of a technical defense, provided by the statute in the interest of what
is 4eemed public· policy, and barren of justice between the parties,'' and
so not in furtherance of justice as required, by the statute relating to amendments. Chlein v. Kabat, 72 Iowa 291, 33 N. W. 771. Other courts, appar_ently without being so strict as to amendment, have followed the 11rincipal case in requiring a special plea. Triphonoff v. Sweeney, 65 Ore. 299,
130 Pac. 979; Raymond v. Phipps, 215 Mass. 559, 102 N. E. 905; Herndon
v. Henderson, 41 Miss. 584; Power v. Brooks, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 204; Finley
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v. Quirk, 9 l\finn. 179, 86 Am. Dec. 93; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fulling,
49 Ind. App. 172, g6 N. E. !)67. On the other band, some courts have
held that the defense may become available although not pleaded. Thus,
in an action to enforce an alleged Sunday contract, the fact that defendant
in his answer did not assert the invalidity of the contract because of its
execution on Sunday, did not preclude him from thereafter availing himself of such defense. Pearson v. Kelly, 122 Wis. 66o, loo N. W. 1o64;
Jacobson v. Bent::ler, 127 Wis. 566, 107 N. W. 7, 4 L. R. A. N. S. II51, II5
Am. St. Rep. 1052. In Pearson v. Kelly, supra, the court said, "To entertain
such actions would aid the parties to enforce agreements which are repugnant
to public policy. Parties to such an agreement are deemed equally guilty in
the eye of the law, and must be left to suffer the consequences of their transgression, and meet with the disapproval of the courts in denying them the
usual remedies of the law." In this case the defense was allowed on appeal.
The holding in the principal case, that the defense of illegality arising from
the making of the contract on Sunday is merely a technical matter of pleading, can hardly be reconciled with the general rule that "in an action at law,
where the defendant does not set up the defense of the illegality of the.
contract used on, but such illegality appears from the ~e as made by
either the plaintJff or defendant, it becomes the duty of the court, sua sponte,
to refuse to entertain the action" ; nor with the corollary to that rule, that
an appellate court will dismiss an action based on an illegal contract notwithstanding the fact that the question of its legality was not raised in the
trial court. Gravier v. Carraby, 17 La. 132; Cansler v. Penlqnd, 125 N. C.
578, 34 S. E. 683.
.
RuLJ; IN SHJ;LL:ey's 0Ast.-A testator devised property to E. S. "and his
male heir forever." On questions arising as to the effect of the devise to
E. S., as to whether be took an estate tail, or a fee simple, or a life interest,
it was held, that the devise fell within the rule of Shelley's Case rather
than within the rule of Archer's Case, for that the words "male heir forever".
were words of limitation and not of purchase. Silcocks v. Silcocks [1916],
2 Ch. 161, 85 L. J. Ch. 464.
Whether a situation was created by the will which brought the rule in
Shelley's Case into operation depends solely upon what "male heir forever''
is taken to mean. Did the testator mean to describe a certain person as
the purchaser or did he merely intend to grant the remainder by way of
limitation to whomsoever should be the male heir of E. S.? This devise
differs in several respects from the usual one upon which the rule in Shel-.
ley's Case (1581), I Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. Rut. Cas. 2o6, operates. It is to
the heir rather than the heirs of E. S. Is this enough to prevent the operation of the rule? No, for in a will the word heir in the singular is primarily
one of limitation and not of pui:chase. Richards v. Bergavenny, 2 Vern. 324
23 Eng. Rut. Cas. 810. 1Archer's Case (1597), I Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rut.
Cas. 146, was decided as without the rule in Shelley's Case, not only because
the remainder was to the next heir male in the singular, ·but also because of
the superadded words of limitation, "to the heirs male of the body of such
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next heir male" which were regarded as indicating that the person who
should be the heir was to ~e as a purchaser and so to become a ne.w stock
of descent. Because the instant case is also a gift to the heir in the singular
number the sole question should be whether there are sufficient superadded
words of limitation, or whether ·there is such a change in the usual order
of the words used as to indicate an intention that the testator meant something other than that the words ''male heir'' were used as words of limitation.
Should the fact that he said "male heir'' instead of "heir male" make any
difference. It has been held that these two phrases have precisely the
same meaning. Blackburn v. Stables, 2 V. & B. 367, 35 Eng. Rut. Cas. 358;
Doe d. Angell
Angell, 15 L. J. Q. B. 193. Should the use of the word
"forever'' take the case out of the rule of Shelley's Case? The court said
it should not, relying on Fuller v. Chamier, L. R. 2 Eq. 682, 35 L. J. Ch.
"772, which held that though the word "forever'' might create a fee "it is
necessary that there should be a clear and distinct limitation to the heir in
the singular number, with the limitation over to the heirs in the plural number, in order to show that the singular heir is made the stirps, and that the
deseent is to take place from him." This rule would limit the application
of A1'cher's Case to a situation entirely analogous, to cases in which practically the same words of limitation were used. It has been suggested that
any form of words which indicates that the heir to whom the remainder is
limited was to take a fee would invoke the rule in Archers Case, 9 Iu,. L.
Rm. 586. But it is submitted that since in Shelley's Case too there was a
gift to the heirs male of E. S. "and the heir male of the body of such heirs
·male" the application of the doctrine of Shelley's Case as applied in Fuller
v. Chamier, supra, is correct. See 29 L. R. A. N. S. g63, note.

v.

SALES-VALIDI'l'Y oF Bm:.K SAY.ES AC'J.'.-The New York Court of Appeals
has declared the so-called SAY.ES IN Bm:.K LAW (Personal Property Law,
§44 L. 1914. Ch. 507), making transfers of goods in bulk presumptively
fraudulent, except upon compliance with prescribed requirements for notice
to creditors of seller, constitutional-Klein et al. v. Marvelas (N. Y. 1916),
II4 N. E. 8og.
In Wright v. Hart (1905), 182 N. Y. 330, a very similar statute enacted
in 1904 (L. 1904, Ch. 569) was held to be in conflict with those clauses of
the Federal and State Constitutions providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that no
s~te shall deny to any person the equal protection of its laws, in that the
statute affected the liberty and property of a limited class of citizens by
arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricting their right to contract for, bargain
and sell a particular kind of property: The clauses in both the federal and
state constitutions referred to in that decision have remained unchanged.
Since that case was decided the validity of similar statutes has been upheld
i[\.~ large number- of states, and by the United States Supreme Court in
Lemieux v. Young, 2n U. S. 48g, and Kidd, Dater and Price Co. v. Mtesselman Grocery Co., 217 U. S. 461. In delivering the opinion of the court in
the principal case, CARDOzo, J., said: '.'W,e think it is our duty to hold that
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the decision in Wright v. Hart is wrong. The unanimous or all but unanimous voice of the judges of the land, in the federal and state courts alike,
has upheld the constitutionality of these laws. At the time of our decision
in Wright v. Hart, such laws were new and strange. They were thought
in the prevailing opinion to represent the fitful prejudices of the .hour."
The New York Court of Appeals is to be commended for frankly admitting
its erroneous decision instead of blindly following it or attempting to distinguish the present statute from the earlier one. A failure of justice often
results from the obstinate refusal of a court to overrule a former decision
which is clearly against the weight of authority and reason. The attitude of
the court of appeals in admitting its error may be compared to that of Lord
MANSFI1"r.D. In speaking of that great common law Judge, ·Bm.tr:a, J.,
(Lickbarrow v. Mason, :2 Term Rep. 63), said: "It is but just to say that
no judge ever saf here more ready than he was to correct an opinion suddenly given at Nisi Prius."
S~FIC Pr:RFORMAN<:t~F CoN'l'RAC't TO AooPT.-The defendant's intestate
apparently adopted the plaintiff and the latter was brought up as a member
of intestate's family. Upon the intestate's death· the plait)tiff brought an
action of specific performance claiming a share of the- former's estate. The
d~ed of adoption was found to be void because of a formal defect; furthermore, it contained no promise to leave the plaintiff any property or to make
her the intestate's heir. Held, that specific performance should not be
granted. Webb v. Mcintosh (Ia. 1916), 159 N. W. 637.
The right of inheritance can only be conferred upon a stranger by strict
compliance with the adoption statute and so if the plaintiff claims as heirat-law, she must fail. Willoughby v. Motley, 83 Ky. 297; Re11s v. Drury,
57 Kan. 84. But in the principal case the plaintiff evidently does not claim
as heir-at-law by virtue of the adoption laws, but rather by virtue of an
implied contract that intestate should 1will a share of her property to the
plaintiff, which contract the plaintiff seeks to enforce against the deceased's
estate. An invalid adoption paper may be·evidence of such a contract Prince
v. Pri11ce (Ala. 1915), 6g So. go6. Where there is a contract to leave one's
property upon his death included in a defective agreement to adopt, the two
contracts may be treated separately and the latter enforced, although the
former cannot be. Starnes v. Hatcher, 1:21 Tenn. 330, n7 S. W. :219. Specific
performance was granted against the personal representative of the promisor
where the agreement in the adoption paper was that the child should inherit the promisor's property or be his heir. Kofka v. Rosicky, 41 Neb. 328,
25 L. R. A. :207, 59 N. W. 788; Anderson v. Blakely, 155 Ia. 430, 136 N. W.
:210. The two last mentioned cases evidently are decided upon the theory
that the promise that the child shall "inherit" is equal to a contract to make
a will leaving a share of property to the child. As to the point of the
plaintiff's ability to sue upon the contract though not a party to it, see Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 78 S. W. 30, 44 I;. R. A. N. S. 773. The last
mentioned case allows specific performance in case the agreement was only
"to adopt," as in the principal case, upon the theory that the parties intended
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that the act of adoption should carry with it the right of inheritance and
that equity will consider as done what ought to be done. · There is at least
,one case which supports the principal case in denying specific performance
under similar circumstances. Albring v. Ward, 137 Mich. 352, IOI N. W.
20+ Though supported by other cases, the argument in Crawford v. Wilson, supra, seems rather strained and metaphysical; its effect is to enforce
a defective adoption agreement.
SUBROGATION-TAXI>$ PAID BY MISTAK£.-Plaintiff, acting under a mistake of fact, paid taxes on defendant's land, and having vainly sought reimbursement from the owner, brings this suit to have his claim subrogated
to that of the County. Held, an equitable iien should be impressed on the
property to the amount of the taxes paid, and the land ordered sold in
satisfaction thereof. Baranowski v. Wetzel, 161 N. Y. Supp. 153.
It is well settled that an equitable lien may ar.ise, in the absence of express contract, to prevent an unjust enrichment. Assistance will not b(l
given to an officious intermeddler, but where the act, from the result of
which relief is sought, is induced by a clear mistake of fact, the party is
not in any proper sense a volunteer, and this fact should rebut the trite
objection to recovery in such a case as this. This case is allied to the situation which arises when one mistakenly improves the land· of another. But
in that case there is serious danger that in enforcing an obligation upon
the owner in the name of unjust enrichment the court would do injustice, for'.
it may well be that under all the circumstances of his situation the owner'
would not be actually benefitted to the extent· of the increased market value
of his land, or would not be financially able to invest in improvements. Even'
with the precauti.onarj provisions of the Betterment Acts, allowing the
owner to elect to abandon his land to the improver upon payment of its
value without the improvement, hardship may result to one who would prefer to retain his land in its original condition. In this case, however, the
owner would have lost his land if the' tax had remained unpaid, and
the relief granted is ·in substance subrogation, the mere substitution of
one creditor for another. These considerations make the case more nearly
analogous to those where one b~ mistake pays. another's debt. A fair
number of cases allow the one paying the debt to be subrogated to the·
rights of the original creditor. 23 L. R. A. 120. The decision r<':tched in·
the principal case seems highly just, and consequently good law. The judgment is prop~rly in the form of a lien, and an order of sale because the
taxes paid constituted a lien against the land. The few cases which have
involved the CJC?.Ct question are . not in accord. A lien on the land was;
given in Goodnow v. Noulton, SI Ia. SSS; Egbers v. Fisher,·73 Wash. 3o8,.
131 Pac. rn28, and Childs v. Smith, SI Wash. 457, 99 Pac. 304 A lien was
denied in Taylor v. Reniger, 147 Mich. 99, no N. W. S03, and Montgomery,
v. City Council of Charle#on, 99 Fed. 825, 40 C. C. A. 1o8. A personal
juilkroent was denied in Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich. s82, lo6 N. W.
II04, and Homestead Co. v. Valley Ry., 17 Walt (U. S.), rs~.
·

